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THE 1974 AMENDMENTS TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT: THE SAFETY VALVE PROVISION § 552(a) (6) (C) EXCUSING




In 1974, Congress amended the Freedom of Information Act.' The over-
riding purpose of this legislation was to secure more efficient, timely, and
complete disclosure of information.' With respect to this goal, Congress recog-
nized that excessive delay by an agency in responding to a request was frequently
tantamount to a denial of the request.' To remedy this defect, legislation was
enacted which required the affected agencies to reply to inquiries and administra-
tive appeals within specified time periods.'
Thus, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (6) (A) was amended to provide:
Each agency, upon any request for records.., shall-
(i) determine within ten [working] days . .. after the receipt of any
such request whether to comply with such request and shall immediately
notify the person making such request of such determination....
(ii) make a determination with respect to any appeal within twenty
[working] days... after the receipt of such appeal....
These time limits of § 552(a) (6) (A) were first qualified by subparagraph (B).
Subparagraph (B) provides that when "unusual circumstances" are present,
such as where records must be collected from field facilities which are separate
from the processing office, or where the request entails the need to search for and
examine a voluminous number of records, then the applicable time limits may be
extended for a period not exceeding an additional ten working days.3 Thereafter,
* A.B., University of Michigan; J.D., University of California, Los Angeles; 1976-77,
Graduate Fellow LL.M. Candidate, Yale University; member of the California Bar.
1 Act of November 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 1(C), 88 Stat. 1561, amending 5
U.S.C. § 552(a) (1970).
2 Thus, one of Congress' primary interests in enacting the amendments was to "ex-
pedite the handling of requests from Federal agencies in order to contribute to the fuller and
faster release of information, which is the basic objective of the Act." H. R. REP. No. 93-876,
93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & A. N-ws 6267.
3 Id. at 6271.
4 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)-(C) (Supp. IV. 1974).
5 In full, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (6) (B) provides:
In unusual circumstances as specified in this subparagraph, the time limits pre-
scribed in either clause (i) or clause (ii) of subparagraph (A) may be extended by
written notice to the person making such request setting forth the reasons for such
extension and the date on which a determination is expected to be dispatched. No
such notice shall specify a date that would result in an extension for more than ten
working days. As used in this subparagraph, "unusual circumstances" means, but
only to the extent reasonably necessary to the proper processing of the particular
request-
(i) the need to search for and collect the requested records from field facilities
or other establishments that are separate from the office processing the request;
(ii) the need to search for, collect, and appropriately examine a voluminous
amount of separate and distinct records which are demanded in a single request; or
(iii) the need for consultation, which shall be conducted with all practicable
speed, with another agency having a substantial interest in the determination of
the request or among two or more components of the agency having substantial
subject matter interest therein.
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an applicant who has neither received the information requested nor had his
request denied "shall be deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies
with respect to such request" 6 and shall be entitled to file suit in federal district
court pursuant to § 552(a) (4) (B).
In order to relieve the affected agency from complying with subparagraph
(B)'s short extensions under narrow circumstances, Congress further qualified §
552(a) (6) (A) by subparagraph (C), a "safety valve" provision, which states:
If the Government can show exceptional circumstances exist and that the
agency is exercising due diligence in responding to the request, the court
may retain jurisdiction and allow the agency additional time to complete its
review of the records.
Thus, even under § 552 (a) (6) (C), the safety valve provision, ultimate access
to the records requested is never the question.' Rather, the issue is the time within
which the agency must comply with or deny an informational request. Thus far,
only a very few courts have been presented with an opportunity to construe §
552 (a) (6) (C).' Even though these courts relied upon the same legislative
history, they have nevertheless reached opposite conclusions.'
A proper construction of § 552(a) (6) (C) is vital for the 1974 amendments
to achieve their intended purpose. As Congress recognized, "information is often
useful only if it is timely."'" With this statement in mind, it becomes evident that
an overly broad construction of the safety valve provision would hinder Congress'
goal of achieving prompt public access to official information." Drawing from
this congressional purpose and judicial decisions which have already interpreted
the safety valve provision, this article attempts to provide the proper approach for
construing § 552 (a) (6) (C). In developing this approach, it must be empha-
sized that there exists no simplistic solution to this troublesome question. Rather,
the solution rests on interpreting vague legislative history to satisfy, as much as is
pragmatically possible, the fundamental goal which Congress clearly expressed
when enacting the 1974 amendments-"the goal of more efficient, prompt, and
full disclosure of information....
II. Proper Construction of § 552(a) (6) (C)
This portion of the article provides an approach for interpreting §
6 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (6) (C).
7 Although ultimate access is not the question, as Congress recognized, excessive delay by
the agency often can be equivalent to the agency denying the request. See H. R. REP. No.
93-876, supra note 2, at 6271. This consequence attending excessive delay is elaborated upon
throughout the article.
8 Exner v. FBI, 542 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1976); Open America v. Watergate Special
Prosecution Force, No. 76-1371 (D.C. Cir. July 7, 1976); Cleaver v. Kelly, 415 F. Supp. 174
(D.D.C. 1976); Hayden v. United States Dep't of Justice, 413 F. Supp. 1285 (D.D.C. 1976);
Fonda v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 76-0289, (D.D.C. -, 1976).
9 Compare Exner v. FBI, 542 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1976) and Hayden v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 413 F. Supp. 1285 (D.D.C. 1976); with Open America v. Watergate Special
Prosecution Force, No. 76-1371 (D.C. Cir. July 7, 1976) and Cleaver v. Kelly, 415 F. Supp.
174 (D.D.C. 1976).
10 H. R. REP. No. 93-876, supra note 2, at 6271.
11 This point was astutely recognized by Judge Leventhal in his concurring opinion in
Open America.
12 H. R. REP. No. 93-876, supra note 2, at 6271.
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552(a)(6)(C). Under § 552(a)(6)(C), the government must satisfy two
criteria before the court may consider granting it additional time to comply with
or deny an informational request. First, the government must show exceptional
circumstances exist. Second, the affected agency must prove that it is exercising
due diligence in responding to the request. Once the government fulfills these
two requirements, the question arises whether the court still has discretion to
deny the agency additional time or whether it must allow such an extension of
time.
A. Logistical Obstacles Excusing Compliance with § 552(a) (6) (A) and (B)
Before the merits of these questions are examined, a preliminary issue must
be considered. The Dept. of Justice, and particularly the FBI, have indicated
that even if they are unable to show the existence of exceptional circumstances
and the exercise of due diligence, the large number of informational requests
and the lack of available personnel have made it virtually impossible for them
to comply with the time periods provided under the amendments."5 Hence, a
court order requiring strict compliance with the relevant time limits would
render the Dept. of Justice and the FBI incapable of complying with such an
order.
Under such circumstances, noncompliance would not necessarily subject
these defendants to a contempt order."' As the Supreme Court and the circuit
courts have recognized, "[ilt would be unreasonable and unjust to hold in con-
tempt a defendant who demonstrated that he was powerless to comply."'" It
must be stressed, however, that the ability of an equity court to refrain from
exercising the contempt sanction when the defendant is incapable of performing,
must not influence that court's obligation to interpret the applicable statute to
fulfill its legislative intent. 6
13 See Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, No. 76-1371; Cleaver v.
Kelly, 415 F. Supp. at 175. See also Brief for Appellants at 19-20, Exner v. FBI, 542 F.2d
1121 (9th Cir. 1976).
14 Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, No. 76-1371, slip op. at 5-6
(Leventhal, J., concurring in the result). It is arguable, however, that the affected agency
should be ordered to reallocate additional funds and personnel to process informational requests.
.See notes 53-55, 118-28 infra and accompanying text.
15 Nal Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 713 (D.C. Cir.
1975). Accord, Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 72-73, 73 n.6 (1948). As stated in the Train
decision:
A federal equity court may exercise its discretion to give or withhold its mandate in
furtherance of the public interest, including specifically the interest in effectuating
the congressional objective incorporated in regulatory legislation. We think the court
may forebear the issuance of an order in those cases where it is convinced by the
official involved that he has in good faith employed the utmost diligence in dis-
charging his statutory responsibilities. The sound discretion of an equity court does
not embrace enforcement through contempt of a party's duty to comply with an order
that calls him "to do an impossibility."
Nat'l Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d at 713.
16 See Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 511 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir.
1975). The court stated that "the reviewing court's duty to 'assure fidelity to the functions
assigned to the regulatory agency by Congress' requires that it hold the agency to its duty to
give reasoned consideration to the facts and issues material to its determinations." Id. at 354,




B. Guidelines for Analyzing § 552(a) (6) (C)
Since courts must construe § 552(a) (6) (C) according to its congressional
mandate even though noncompliance would not necessarily subject the defendant
to contempt, one should analyze the statutory provision within the following
organizational guidelines. First, are exceptional circumstances present? Second,
is the affected agency exercising due diligence in responding to the request?
Third, does the court have discretion to deny the agency additional time even
though the above two requirements have been satisfied? Fourth, what remedies
may the court impose if the agency is not relieved from complying with the
statutory time limits? Because all of the cases thus far decided have concerned
informational requests from the files of the FBI, this article confines itself to
examining the procedures utilized by that particular agency. The principles
enunciated, however, apply not solely to the FBI, but to all agencies covered by
the Freedom of Information Act.
C. Factual Background of Cases Involving the Interpretation of § 552(a) (6) (C)
In order to better comprehend the requirements of exceptional circum-
stances and due diligence within § 552 (a) (6) (C), however, it is first necessary
to supply a brief factual account of the cases which have been decided under this
provision. Included within this list are two circuit and two district court hold-
ings.
1 7
1. Exner v. FBI
The most recent decision rendered was by the Ninth Circuit in Exner v.
FBI." In that case, Judith Exner sought access to all records possessed by the
FBI which contained information about her. After receiving no response to this
inquiry within the ten-day period set forth in § 552(a) (6) (A), she notified the
Dept. of Justice that such failure to respond was considered a denial of her re-
quest. Four days later, FBI Director Clarence Kelly replied to the Exner inquiry,
seeking additional time to process her application." Asserting that the delay was
inevitable, Director Kelly remarked:
The FBI has 5,964 [Freedom of Information/Privacy Act] requests on hand.
Processing has begun and is in various stages of completion on 991 of those
cases. In an effort to deal fairly with any request requiring the retrieval,
processing and duplication of documents, each request is being handled in
chronological order based on the date of receipt. Please be assured that
your request is being handled as equitably as possible and that all documents
which can be released will be made available at the earliest possible date.
20
17 Exner v. FBI, 542 F.2d 1121 '(9th Cir. 1976); Open America v. Watergate Special
Prosecution Force, No. 76-1371 (D.C. Cir. July 7, 1976); Cleaver v. Kelly, 415 F. Supp. 174
(D.D.C. 1976); Hayden v. United States Dep't of Justice, 413 F. Supp. 1285 (D.D.C. 1976).
The district court's order in Fonda v. United, States Dep't of Justice, No. 76-0289, (D.D.C.
1976), was a short two-paragraph disposition granting the agency's motion for a stay to not
exceed six months in order to permit it to process the plaintiff's informational request. The
Fonda decision will not be discussed in the text of this article.
18 542 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1976).
19 Brief for Appellants at 3, Exner v. FBI, 542 F.2d 1121.
20 Id. at 4. Mr. Kelly's remark here appears to be a form letter sent to all applicants
demanding that their requests be processed within the statutory time limits.
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After receiving the Director's response, Exner requested that Mr. Quinlin Shea,
Chief of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Unit of the Office of the
Deputy Attorney General, give her inquiry priority status on the basis that "she
has been so prominent in the media lately that she is in physical danger until
such time as all her recollections are committed to a writing" and that "the docu-
ment which will be produced will be of historical significance."2' Mr. Shea re-
fused to expedite handling of Bxner's request on this ground, indicating that her
arguments were without substance.22 He nevertheless forwarded her request
for priority status to Director Kelly. The Director likewise declined Exner's
priority handling request.23 Thereafter, Exner brought suit in district court
pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (B) and
the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (3) (A).24
2. Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force
The other circuit court which has construed § 552(a) (6) (C) is the District
of Columbia Circuit. In Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution
Force,25 the plaintiffs, a law professor and students at a Washington, D.C. law
school, 21 sent identical letters to, among others, Attorney General Levi and FBI
Director Kelly. These letters demanded access to all records which contained
information regarding the role that former FBI Acting Director, L. Patrick Gray,
played in the Watergate affair.2 After the FBI failed to process this inquiry
within the statutory time limits of § 552(a) (6) (A), the plaintiffs filed suit
seeking to compel the agency to immediately comply with or deny their request.28
3. Cleaver v. Kelly and Hayden v. United States Department of Justice
The two district courts which have considered this question are both in the
District of Columbia Circuit. 9 In Cleaver v. Kelly,"0 Eldridge and Kathleen
21 Id. at 4 (emphasis in original).
22 Id.
23 In so doing, Director Kelly advised her counsel that "[I]f your client believes she is
in physical danger or has any evidence regarding threats against her life, I strongly urge you
to bring this information to the attention of the proper authorities." The district court dis-
agreed with Director Kelly's response to the Exner request. See note 100 infra.
24 See 542 F.2d at 1122.
25 No. 76-1371 (D.C. Cir. July 7, 1976).
26 Id. slip op. at 5, n.9.
27 Id. slip op. at 2-3. These letters warned that "flailure to reply to this request within
the ten-day period provided by the Act will be treated as a denial of the request, and appeal
will be sought." Nearly a month later, the Director replied to the request, noting that it had
been received. Shortly thereafter, Open America appealed, stating that "[i]f you do not act
upon my request within 20 working days, I will deem our request denied." This letter was
acknowledged, the reply informing the plaintiff that its request would be processed in due
course. Id. slip op. at 3.
28 Id. slip op. at 3-4.
29 An argument can be made that the two district court decisions still remain good law
despite the circuit court's decision in Open America. Concurring in the result reached by the
court, Judge Leventhal stated that the majority had gone "beyond the holding which . . .
requires this case to be remanded to the district court for further proceedings, delivers dictum
accepting the broad premise for relief asserted by the Department of Justice, dictum in which
I do not join." Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, No. 76-1371, slip op. at
2 (Leventhal, J., concurring in the result). Judge Leventhal's assertion that much of the
majority's decision was dictum was quoted by the Ninth Circuit in Exner v. Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 542 F.2d 1121, 1123 '(9th Cir. 1976).
30 415 F. Supp. 174 (D.D.C. 1976).
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Cleaver filed an inquiry with the Dept. of Justice pertaining to any records or
files which related to them or their activities. Expedited status was requested on
the ground that this material was relevant to Mr. Cleaver's imminent trial in the
California state courts. The FBI refused the Cleavers' request, stating that the
agency was processing the inquiries in chronological order determined by the
date that the request was received. Thereupon, the Cleavers filed suit, arguing
that they should be furnished this information on an expedited basis."1
Similarly, in Hayden v. United States Department of Justice,"3 Tom Hayden
sought all records from the FBI relating to or concerning himself. Well after the
FBI failed to comply with the time limits of § 552(a) (6) (A), Hayden brought
suit in an effort to compel disclosure rather than wait any longer for the release
of this information. 3
It is interesting to note than in each case the government contended that
the large number of informational requests rendered it impossible for it to process
the complaining party's request within the statutory time limits without giving
that request preference over others which had been filed at an earlier time.
Therefore, in order to maintain the agency's chronological processing policy, it
was necessary for that party to wait its turn. Phrased another way, the govern-
ment argued that it had exercised due diligence in responding to all informational
inquiries but that exceptional circumstances, created by a massive deluge of
requests, had prevented the agency from complying with or denying these
requests within the statutory time periods. Under these extremely difficult condi-
tions, the government asserted that this situation was the very type of circum-
stance for which § 552(a) (6) (C), the safety valve provision, was designed. 4
D. The Exceptional Circumstances Requirement of § 552(a) (6) (C)
To determine whether a given situation falls under the safety valve provision
of § 552(a) (6) (C), a court first must consider whether the government has
shown that exceptional circumstances exist. The question arises, however,
whether this requirement applies only to an agency's handling of a single, com-
plex or voluminous request, or whether it also includes the situation in which an
agency is flooded with an overwhelming number of informational requests.
Two courts have strongly implied that exceptional circumstances are present
only when an agency is faced with processing a particularly troublesome request,
and not when an overly large number of requests have been filed.33 The other
31 Id. at 175.
32 413 F. Supp. 1285 (D.D.C. 1976).
33 Id. at 1287. Before filing suit, Hayden waited an additional five months after the
statutory time limits had expired. In replying to Hayden's complaint, the FBI requested an
indefinite stay, informing the court that under the agency's work load, it would take an ad-
ditional four years to process Hayden's request. Id. at 1287-88.
34 See, e.g., Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, No. 76-1371, slip op. at
7.
35 See Hayden v. United States Dep't of Justice, 413 F. Supp. 1287 (D.D.C. 1976);
Bxner v. FBI, No. (S.D. Cal.), remanded, 542 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1976). As stated by
the Hayden court:
While the Court agrees that under certain conditions an abnormally large number of
responsive documents might constitute an exceptional circumstance, it is not entirely
persuaded that . . . many unfilled requests and several court orders compelling com-
pliance, constitutes such circumstances within the meaning of the Act.
Hayden v. United States Dep't of Justice, 413 F. Supp. at 1288.
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courts which have considered the question, however, including the District of
Columbia and Ninth Circuits, have stated that such exceptional circumstances
exist if an agency is faced with an overwhelming number of informational re-
quests."8 The legislative history on this question, unfortunately, fails to provide
a definitive answer. The clearest pronunciation appears in the Senate Report on
the 1974 amendments. That Report states that exceptional circumstances will
not be found "where the agency had not, during the period before administrative
remedies had been exhausted, committed all appropriate and available personnel
to the review and deliberation process.""7 Hence, the question remains whether
"the review and deliberation process" refers to the handling of requests received
in toto or to only the particular request at hand.
Although far from clear, the conclusion should be reached that this process
should be interpreted to extend to an agency's difficulties in handling all informa-
tional requests, taking into account the volume, number, and complexity of these
requests. There are several reasons supporting this contention.
First, § 552(a) (6) (C) provides that the government must show "excep-
tional circumstances exist." The exceptional circumstances requirement is not
modified by any other conditions. The due diligence requirement, however, does
mandate that the agency exercises due diligence "in responding to the request."'
Hence, it is certainly plausible to conclude that if Congress desired exceptional
circumstances to exist only when an agency was confronted with a particularly
complex or voluminous request, it would have worded the exceptional circum-
stances requirement in the following manner: "If the Government can show
exceptional circumstances exist with respect to the request....,,s9
Second, the Senate Report specifically provides that the agency must com-
mit "all appropriate and available personnel" to the decision-making process.
Utilizing this language, a strong argument can be advanced that if only one
particular request is involved, there rarely would be a situation where exceptional
circumstances would exist. Since only one request is at issue, the government
would be in an extremely difficult position to prove that it did not have adequate
manpower to either comply with or deny that particular request within the
statutory time limits. But if the phrase, "all appropriate and available personnel"
refers to the processing of informational requests in toto, then the language in the
Senate Report takes on an entirely different and more logical meaning. Under
this interpretation, if the agency could prove that it was employing all available
and appropriate manpower to scrutinize all informational requests but, because of
the huge number and volume of these inquiries, could not complete review of
the plaintiffs request within the statutory time periods, then that agency would
36 See Exner v. FBI, 542 F.2d at 1123; Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecu-
tion Force, No. 76-1371, slip op. at 20.
37 S. REP. No. 93-854, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1974).
38 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (6)'(C) (emphasis added).
39 Another question is the role of § 552(a) (6) (B). That provision provides that under
certain limited circumstances, an agency may have up to an additional ten working days to
process the request. See note 5 supra and accompanying text. As pointed out by Judge
Leventhal and by Judge Bryant in the Hayden decision, this provision was specifically intended
to encompass the "voluminous material" request. The provision was not designed to be
employed by an agency which simply processed large volumes of requests. See Open America
v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, No. 76-1371, slip op. at 4-5 (Leventhal, J., con-
curring in the result); 413 F. Supp. at 1288.
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have shown that exceptional circumstances exist. Such an approach, since it
provides significant meaning to the Senate Report, should accordingly be
adopted."'
Third, applying this definitional concept of exceptional circumstances to
the procedures utilized by the FBI, it has contended that its allotment of person-
nel, together with the overwhelming number of informational requests, suffici-
ently proves that it has carried its burden of showing the existence of exceptional
circumstances." Legislative history indicates that Congress, in enacting the 1974
amendments, did not contemplate that their effect would be to substantially
increase costs and the need for additional manpower in a particular agency."'
The House Committee calculated the total additional expenditure of the 1974
amendments for all agencies at $50,000 during 1974 and at $100,000 for each
of the following five years.4 However, it is now clear that Congress grossly
miscalculated the number of requests for information which would be made
and the financial and personnel resources necessary to process these requests.4'
The FBI has since reallocated personnel and expended additional funds to meet
this overwhelming burden. 5 Nevertheless, it still is unable to comply with or
deny informational requests within the statutory time limits. In view of the fact
that Congress has appropriated neither adequate funds nor personnel to remedy
this situation, the District of Columbia Circuit declared:
40 Not surprisingly, such an interpretation would receive the government's support. The
Dept. of Justice has contended that "the language of subsection (a) (6)'(C) . . . is sufficiently
broad to permit a court to find that an overwhelming volume of separate requests received by a
single agency can constitute 'exceptional circumstances' . . . ." Brief for Appellants at 18,
Exner v. FBI, 542 F.2d 1121.
41 Id. at 18-19.
42 The House Report states:
[Tihe committee finds with respect to fiscal year 1974 and each of the five fiscal
years following that potential costs directly attributable to this bill should, for the
most part, be absorbed within the operating budgets of the agencies.
This legislation merely revises information procedures under the Freedom of In-
formation Act but does not create costly new administrative functions. Thus, activities
required by this bill should be carried out by Federal agencies with existing staff, so
that significant amounts of additional funds will not be required. It may be necessary,
however, for some agencies to reassign personnel, shift administrative responsibilities,
or otherwise restructure certain offices to achieve a higher level of efficiency.
H. R. REP. No. 93-876, supra note 2, 6274-75.
43 Id. at 6275.
44 One year prior to the enactment of the amendments, the FBI had a staff of eight
people to process these informational requests which were received at a rate of approximately
one request per day. Cleaver v. Kelly, 415 F. Supp. at 176.
As to the number of requests received during 1975, this figure rose to an average number
of 53 requests per workday. In the first two months of 1976 alone, this already large number
of requests again increased so that a total number of 2,288 inquiries were received during this
period. "'Exceptional circumstances' are demonstrated by the increase in requests from ap-
proximately one per day in 1973 before the Amendments . . . to 13,875 in 1975." Id. See
Brief for Appellants at 19, Exner v. FBI, 542 F.2d 1121.
In fiscal year 1974, that agency's cost for implementing the amendments was $160,000.
In fiscal year 1975, this figure rose to $462,000 and for fiscal year 1976, the cost is estimated
at $2,675,000. For fiscal year 1977, the FBI approximates that the cost for the amendments
will be the same as in 1976, $2,675,000, plus another $725,000 to implement the Privacy Act
of 1974. Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, No. 76-1371, slip op. at 12.
45 In 1975, the FBI increased the number of personnel handling information requests to
191. Id. at 13. The staff now includes 23 law-trained agents. Brief for Appellants at 19,
Exner v. FBI, 542 F.2d 1121. This total number is comparable to the number of agents who
are employed at the headquarters' general investigatory section. 415 F. Supp. at 176.
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If Congress' anticipation of the burden thrust upon all agencies by its 1974
[Freedom of Information Act] amendments is to be taken as a measuring
stick, then surely the demands placed on this one agency by Congress' action
may reasonably be viewed as "exceptional circumstances." 46
But as Judge Leventhal indicated in his concurring opinion in Open
America,"7 the safety valve provision of § 552 (a) (6) (C) was carefully drafted
to place a substantial burden on an agency to justify any noncompliance with
relevant time limits imposed by the 1974 amendments." Hence, in order to
show the existence of exceptional circumstances, an agency must satisfy a rigorous
standard. It must prove that it has "committed all appropriate and available
personnel to the review and deliberation process."49 Further, an agency's burden
to show these circumstances is an ongoing one. A short-term inability to timely
comply with or deny informational requests, due to a huge increase in the number
of these requests, will not necessarily excuse the agency in the future. In each
case, the agency cannot rely upon prior cases to show the existence of exceptional
circumstances but must affirmatively prove that it is employing all appropriate
and available personnel in the decision-making process.
Has the FBI satisfied this heavy burden? An argument can be made that
the employment of "all appropriate and available personner' means exactly what
it says, namely, that the agency must reassign as many of its employees as neces-
sary to meet the pertinent statutory time limits. Whether this reallocation of per-
sonnel entails 10 percent or 90 percent of the total number of employees is im-
material under this view. The more logical approach, however, is to recognize
that an agency has important functions assigned to it other than the processing of
informational requests. In the case of the FBI, it is uncontrovertible that this
agency has vital law enforcement duties to perform." To interpret the existence
46 Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, No. 76-1371, slip op. at 12.
In finding the existence of exceptional circumstances, the Cleaver court stated that "the back-
log with which the Agency is now faced was not predictable or expected; indeed, it is excep-
tional." 415 F. Supp. at 176.
47 Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, No. 76-1371 (Leventhal, J.,
concurring in the result).
48 Id. at 3. In so recognizing, Judge Leventhal noted that the 1974 amendments were
enacted to compel increased agency expedition in processing informational requests.
49 S. RiE. No. 93-854, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1974) (emphasis added).
50 In vetoing the bill, President Ford expressed his concern that law enforcement agencies
would be overburdened with processing informational requests:
I believe that confidentiality would not be maintained if many millions of pages of
FBI and other investigatory law enforcement files would be subject to compulsory
disclosure at the behest of any person unless the Government could prove to a court-
separately for each paragraph of each document-that disclosure 'would" cause a typeof harm specified in the amendment. Our law enforcement agencies do not have, and
could not obtain, the large number of trained and knowledgeable personnel that would
be needed to make such a line-by-line examination of information requests that some-
times involve hundreds of thousands of documents, within the time constraints addedto current law by this bill.
Therefore, I propose that more flexible criteria govern the responses for particularly
lengthy investigatory records to mitigate the burden which these amendments would
otherwise impose, in order not to dilute the primary responsibilities of these law
enforcement activities.
10 WEEKLY CoMP. oF PRs. Doc. 1318 (Oct. 17, 1974).
Responding to this criticism, Congressman Morehead, one of the sponsors of the bill,
reassured the President that "[n]o one wants to burden law enforcement agencies or to take
their attention away from the difficult job of fighting the growing menace of crime in Amer-
ica." 129 CONG. Rac. 10865 (1974).
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of exceptional circumstances to signify the deployment of all personnel to com-
plete the review and deliberation process within statutory time limits would leave
the FBI with time to do little else. Under such a construction, the FBI would
be incapable of performing its law enforcement obligations in a satisfactory
manner.
Taking the above considerations into account, the term "all appropriate and
available personnel" must signify the placement of as many employees as possible
in the review and deliberation process while still maintaining a high level of
efficiency for the accomplishment of the agency's other objectives. Applying this
principle to the FBI, that agency has reassigned a large number of its employees
from other departments within the agency to process requests filed pursuant to
the Freedom of Information Act. Such reallocation of personnel, however, does
not by itself indicate that the FBI is unable to transfer additional employees to
process these informational requests. Rather, in order to show the existence of
exceptional circumstances, the FBI must show that the reassignment of any ad-
ditional personnel would render the operation of the agency's other functions
significantly less efficient. In the cases thus far decided, the FBI has not made
such a showing. Thus under the above formulated approach, without such proof,
the FBI has failed to satisfy its burden under the safety valve provision of §
552(a) (6) (C)."
E. The Exercise of Due Diligence Requirement of § 552(a)(6)(C)
1. Chronological Processing Policy of the FBI
In order to determine whether a particular agency is exercising due diligence
within the meaning of § 552(a) (6) (C), one must first examine the agency's
procedure for processing informational requests. In the case of the FBI, that
agency employs a "two-track" system which separates simple ("non-project")
from more complicated and time-consuming requests ("project"). After placing
the requests into these two categories, the FBI processes them in chronological
sequence.5 2 In defending this first-come first-served policy in the courts, the
FBI has asserted a number of reasons. First, the agency claims that the primary
reason it adheres to chronological processing is that it treats all requesters
equitably." Second, the FBI contends, when courts order that particular requests
51 Surprisingly, the cases thus far decided have examined the agency's backlog, number of
requests filed, cost expenditures, and number of employees assigned to process informational
requests. On these factors alone, exceptional circumstances have been found to exist. See,
e.g., Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, No. 76-1371, slip op. at 20. But
query whether such circumstances can be deemed exceptional if the agency's ability to re-
allocate additional funds and personnel is never scrutinized.
52 See Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, No. 76-1371, slip op. at
12-13. "While the 'two-track' system expedites simple requests and identifies those matters
which will be more difficult and time-consuming, on each track, the FBI attempts to proceed
on a strictly first-in, first-out basis and to maintain approximately the same rate of progress."
Id. at 13.
53 Brief for Appellants at 23, Exner v. FBI, 542 F.2d 1121. This argument had the
greatest impact upon the Open America court: "The real parties at interest here may not be
the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI at all, but the 5,137 other persons or organi-
zations who made requests prior to plaintiff Open America." Open America v. Watergate
Special Prosecution Force, No. 76-1371, slip op. at 17. For reasons stated later in this section,
the policy of equal treatment among all requesters should be an irrelevant consideration under
the due diligence concept. See notes 73-75 infra and accompanying text.
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be given priority status, such favorable treatment disrupts the efficiency of the
agency's procedure.5 Further, the FBI argues that the upholding of its chrono-
logical processing approach would minimize the number of suits filed when the
agency fails to comply with the ten- and twenty-day period permitted for re-
sponses under § 552(a) (6) (A). 5
2. Judicial Reactions to the Chronological Processing Policy of the FBI
Upon examining the FBI's chronological processing policy, the District of
Columbia Circuit, in Open America, approved of that policy with the exception
that if a genuine urgency was attached to the inquiry, then that inquiry should
receive expedited treatment. The majority stated:
We believe that Congress intended to guarantee access to Government
agency documents on an equal and fair basis. Good faith and due diligence
call for a procedure which is fair overall in the particular agency. We
believe also that Congress wished to reserve the role of the courts for two
occasions, (1) when the agency was not showing due diligence in processing
plaintiff's individual request or was lax overall in meeting its obligations
under the Act with all available resources, and (2) when plaintiff can show a
genuine need and reason for urgency in gaining access to Government
records ahead of prior applicants for information .... 56
Concluding that the FBI had exercised due diligence, that the agency had shown
the existence of exceptional circumstances, and that the plaintiffs were unable to
prove any need or reason to justify expedited status, the court held that the
54 Brief for Appellants at 24, Exner v. FBI, 542 F.2d 1121. Although the government
claims that this consideration is secondary to the objective of treating all requesters equitably,
it appears that maintenance of chronological processing under all circumstances is extremely
important for the government to maintain efficient operation. Thus, the government argues
that any priority treatment given to certain individuals renders the affected agency less efficient.
The Open America majority agreed with this contention. Open America v. Watergate Special
Prosecution Force, No. 76-1371, slip op. at 17-18. On the other hand, it can be argued that
giving certain requesters priority status should not disrupt the agency's efficiency. In this situa-
tion, all the agency is doing is moving a certain request "up the line," hence moving other
requests "down the line." Thus, the agency is merely substituting one request for another.
55 This argument primarily is designed as a tactic to warn the' courts that the failure to
uphold the agency's chronological processing approach will result in their being overburdened
with requesters seeking expedited status:
[I]f chronological processing is upheld by the courts of appeals and stays under 5
U.S.C. 552(a) (6) (C) are encouraged, suits brought at the end of the ten- and
twenty-day period allowed for responses under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) (6) (A) without
further exhaustion of administrative remedies will be minimized. Thus courts will be
ared the necessity of entertaining and giving expedited consideration to many
reedom of Information Act] suits in which no genuine case or controversy may
ever exist. If on the other hand, expedited consideration is automatically accorded
litigants at the expense of other requesters despite the provisions of 5 U.S.C.
552 (a) (6) (C), plainly all requesters will be encouraged to litigate, particularly since
if they prevail in their suits they may seek court costs and attorneys fees pursuant to
S U.S.C. 552(a) (4)'(E).
Brief for Appellants at 24-25, Exner v. FBI, 542 F.2d 1121. For further discussion on this
subject, basically disagreeing with the government's argument, see notes 75-82 infra and ac-
companying text.
56 Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, No. 76-1371, slip op. at 20.
Thus, the Open America court made it manifestly clear that the burden is upon the plaintiff to
allege an exceptional need and urgency for the information he seeks. This approach has been
highly criticized. See notes 76-82 infra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 52:235]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
plaintiffs were not entitled to relief."
Although concurring in the result reached by the majority in Open America,
Judge Leventhal severely criticized its reasoning. His opinion has been praised
and approved by the Ninth Circuit in its Exner decision." While the Ninth
Circuit held, as Judge Leventhal had expressed, that the chronological processing
policy utilized by the FBI ordinarily seems reasonable," Judge Leventhal re-
marked that an effective demonstration of due diligence might depend as well
upon other considerations." These factors include: (1) whether the agency has
requested additional funds to meet the unexpected increase in informational in-
quiries; (2) whether it has allowed partial release of records rather than per-
mitting release only when the request has been totally processed; and (3)
whether the agency has deferred determining whether it will voluntarily disclose
material clearly outside the scope of the Freedom of Information Act, for the
purpose of expediting release of information expressly covered by the Act.62
But what particularly upset Judge Leventhal was the majority's interpreta-
tion of the due diligence concept.6 By placing the burden upon the plaintiff to
show a genuine need and reason for urgency, Judge Leventhal concluded that
the majority had misconstrued the purpose underlying the 1974 amendments:
What the majority dictum would contemplate . . . is a scheme that turns
the burden of proof mandated by Congress upside down. No longer must
the Government make out a case of exceptional circumstances; instead the
plaintiff will be required to show a "genuine need and reason for urgency."
... This seems to me a clear departure from the very premise of the section
we are engaged in interpreting. It is not supported by statutory language,
and indeed seems in conflict with the entire remedial thrust of the 1974
amendments .... 64
Referring to a letter from Deputy Attorney General Tyler to Congresswoman
Abzug, Chairwoman of the Government Information and Individual Rights
57 Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, No. 76-1371, slip op. at 21.
Compare the problems raised by § 552(a) (6) (A)-(C) with those arising from Rule 26(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule provides for discovery of "the existence,
description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible
things," qualified by the provision that the request must be regarding matter "which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.. . ." For a discussion of this
rule and relevant cases interpreting its applicability, see 4 J. MooRE, FEDERa.L PRACTICe 11 26.58
(2d ed. 1976).
58 Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, No. 76-1371 (Leventhal, J,
concurring in the result).
59 542 F.2d at 1123.
60 Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, No. 76-1371, slip op. at 7-8
(Leventhal, J., concurring in the result).
61 Id. at 8-9.
62 Id. at 5. Whether the due diligence concept also includes notifying the requester that
information sought by him is located in the files of another agency providing is an open
question. There is every reason to place this responsibility on the agency. Otherwise, the
requester, who is unaware that pertinent information is located elsewhere, will never obtain
access to this material. The burden on the agency is minimal. It need only inform the ap-
plicant of facts which it already knows or should know. The agency's responsibility termi-
nates at that point. On the other hand, for the requester, the benefits to be derived from
placing this minimal burden on the agency are enormous.
63 Disagreeing with the majority's interpretation, Judge Leventhal observed: "The safety
valve provisions of § 552(a) (6) (C) were carefully crafted to put a substantial burden on the
government to justify to the courts any noncompliance with [Freedom of Information Act]
time limits." Id. at 3.
64 Id.
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Subcommittee, Judge Leventhal has strong authority to support his position. In
that letter to Congresswoman Abzug, Deputy Attorney General Tyler argued:
Absent some wholly arbitrary refusal to expedite a particular request or
appeal when exceptional circumstances exist, each individual should be
required to wait his or her turn in line. The law as presently written places
the burden on the Government to prove that a case should not receive
preferential, expedited treatment. This imbalance should be corrected, in
fairness to other requesters and to eliminate an unnecessary contribution to
the congestion of court dockets in the Federal Judicial System.65
Nevertheless, Judge Leventhal notes that in the present case the FBI may have
shown that exceptional circumstances exist.6" If that were true, then in order for
the plaintiffs to receive expedited status, they must make "a special allegation of
urgency in processing.... ."" Otherwise, the government would be able to take
advantage of the safety valve provision of § 552 (a) (6) (C).6s
3. Analysis of Judicial Reactions to the Chronological Processing
Policy of the FBI
Is the Open America majority or the Exner-Leventhal view correct in de-
fining the concept of due diligence, or are both approaches incorrect? To reach
the proper conclusion, analysis must begin with the following question: Does an
agency's exercise of due diligence apply only to the particular request at hand or to
requests received in toto? The statutory language contained in § 552 (a) (6) (C)
provides the proper answer: the agency must show that it "is exercising due
diligence in responding to the request ... ,,6 Thus, unlike the existence of
exceptional circumstances, in exercising due diligence the agency must show
65 Letter from Deputy Attorney General Harold Tyler to the Honorable Bella Abzug,
Chairwoman, Government Information & Individual Rights Subcommittee, Committee on
Government Operations, March 15, 1976, reprinted in, id. at 1 n.1 (emphasis added). In
that letter, Deputy Attorney General Tyler also argued:
One of the provisions in the amendments to the Act that certainly has not worked
out as anyone intended is the imposition of very short time limits for the processing
of requests. I fully understand and accept the desire of Congress to demonstrate the
importance it attached to the reasonably expeditious processing of requests for
access to records. In my opinion, however, any time limit that does not take into
consideration the number and complexity of the records within the scope of the in-
dividual request is both unrealistic and wholly unworkable.
There is one additional serious problem I desire to bring to your specific attention.
That is the situation created by those cases in which we are sued before the ad-
ministrative review process has been completed. Although the number of such cases
is not particularly great, this unfortunate provision in the Act usually results in the
individual who has sued receiving preferential consideration over the far greater
number of other [usually prior] requesters and appellants who choose not to file suit,
or who cannot do so.
Id.
66 Id. at 3.
67 Id. at 5. In so stating, .ufdge Leventhal strongly implied that the applicant must provide
reasons to justify his request being granted expedited status. This interpretation is contrary
to the principles advanced by both the Act and the 1974 amendments. For further analysis
suggesting a proposed correct approach, see notes 76-82 infra and accompanying text.
68 Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, No. 76-1371, slip op. at 11-12
(Leventhal, j., concurring in the result).
69 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (6)'(C) (emphasis added).
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that it is responding diligently to the request at hand, not to all requests in
general."
The fact that the agency must exercise due diligence in responding to the
request is important in determining whether the implementation of a chrono-
logical processing policy comports with the philosophy underlying the safety
valve provision of § 552 (a) (6) (C). Due diligence under this provision signifies
that the agency has the burden to justify noncompliance with statutory time
limits."' As the House Report expressly recognized, the intent of the 1974
amendments was to require the affected agency "to respond to inquiries and
administrative appeals within specific time limits. ' 72 At first glance, a chron-
ological processing system appears incongruous with this congressional objective.
Under such a system, the agency adopts a policy that, once an informational
request is filed, the numerous other requests filed beforehand must be processed
prior to the subject request. While this policy appears to promote equal treat-
ment among all requesters," whether this result is at all relevant under the due
diligence concept is another question. The answer is that any consideration of
equal treatment is wholly irrelevant. The reason underlying this conclusion is
clear. Due diligence is concerned only with the agency's conduct in responding
to the request at hand, not to all requests in general. Hence, each request must
be viewed separately rather than in conjunction with other requests. Because of
this fact, the agency cannot viably argue that it is exercising due diligence because
it is treating all requests equally. Rather, the agency can only successfully assert
due diligence if it is responding to the particular request in a manner which
satisfies the congressional intent underlying § 552(a) (6) (C), namely, that
despite the agency's good faith efforts and efficient allocation of available re-
sources, circumstances render it impossible to process the subject request within
the statutory time limits.7
4. Proposed Approaches for Processing Requests
On the other hand, it is evident that the agency must devise some sort of
70 The government, not surprisingly, has argued that the due diligence concept applies to
requests received in toto. Criticizing the district court's interpretation, the government's ap-
pellate brief to the Exner court asserted:
There is nothing in the Act or the legislative history of [Section 552(a) (6) (C)] ...
to warrant the assumption made by the court below that the terms "exceptional
circumstances" and "due diligence" must relate to an agency's handling of a single
complex or voluminous request.
Brief for Appellants at 18, Exner v. FBI, 542 F.2d 1121. With respect to due diligence, the
government's argument is dearly incorrect. See Hayden v. United States Dep't of Justice, 413
F. Supp 1285, 1288 (D.D.C. 1976); Exner v. FBI, No. - (rep. trans. at 14-15, S.D. Cal.),
remanded, 542 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1976).
71 Thus, the Ninth Circuit's and Judge Leventhal's interpretations are correct in placing
the burden upon the noncomplying agency. Judge Leventhal's approach, however, is incorrect
to the extent that it requires the applicant to provide reasons explaining why his request
should receive expedited status. For a discussion elaborating on this subject, see notes 76-82
infra and accompanying text.
72 H. R. REP. No. 93-876, supra note 2, at 6271.
73 The policy of treating all requesters on an equal basis has been the primary argument
that the government has used to persuade the courts that its chronological processing ap-
proach should be upheld. See Brief for Defendant at 23, Exner v. FBI, 542 F.2d 1121. See also
note 57 supra and accompanying text.
74 See notes 80-85 in fra and accompanying text. This burden is not an overly harsh one
to impose upon the agency. Any agency which efficiently utilizes its personnel and financial
resources should have no difficulties in complying with the proposed approach.
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system to process informational requests. The FBI has adequately shown that, at
least in the short run, available personnel and funds make it impossible to process
each request immediately after it is filed."' Hence, the question must be raised
whether each requester must wait his turn in line, or whether some requests may
be processed before others. The answer to this inquiry may be derived from the
prevailing theme underlying the concept of due diligence: the principle that due
diligence concerns only the particular request at hand. With this principle in
mind, two conclusions may be reached. First, so long as the requester makes no
allegation of urgency in submitting his inquiry, the agency may utilize a chron-
ological processing policy provided it operates this system in an efficient manner,
taking into account the agency's personnel and financial resources. Second, if,
however, the requester alleges urgency, such an allegation merits expedited treat-
ment. In this situation, the agency must process the request prior to others which,
though filed earlier, included no allegation of urgency.
Must such allegation of urgency contain the basis for the right to expedited
status and must the requester allege, or perhaps even show, the specific reasons for
which he needs the relevant material? The rationale for compelling such allega-
tions rests on distinguishing between those requesters who have a need to examine
their own files as opposed to those who are merely satisfying personal curiosity:'
Although this argument appears meritorious, it must be rejected because it is con-
trary to the spirit and policy underlying the Freedom of Information Act. That
policy is to compel the disclosure of all government information, not subject to
specific exemptions, to the general public, without inquiring into an individual's
"need to know."77 As phrased by the House Committee on Government Oper-
ations:
It was not the intent of Congress that any person should have a stated
reason for wishing to see any particular Government document or record,
75 This point is not disputed. Rather, the issue is whether some requests may be processed
before others which were filed earlier in time. In the courts, the government has adhered to
the position that the chronological processing sequence must be utilized in all circumstances
and each requester must at all times wait his turn in line. See Brief for Appellants at 20, Exner
v. FBI, 542 F.2d 1121.
76 As stated in Exner:
The observation is made ... that there are thousands of requests, that Mrs. Exner
should just wait her turn in line. I would hazard to guess that many, many of those
thousands of requests may be trivial, may be curiosity seekers, may be persons who
want information for various reasons. I think with regard to Mrs. Exner, she is a
person who is herself directly concerned, and I don't think that under the circum-
stances she should just have to wait in line.
Exner v. FBI, No. - (rep. trans. at 19-20 S.D. Cal.), remanded, 542 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir.
1976).
77 See Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971), where the court recognized
that:
Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act in response to a persistent problem of
legislators and citizens, the problem of obtaining adequate information to evaluate
federal programs and formulate wise policies. Congress recognized that the public
cannot make intelligent decisions without such information, and that governmental
institutions become unresponsive to public needs if knowledge of their activities is
denied to the people and their representatives. The touchstone of any proceedings
under the Act must be the clear legislative intent to assure public access to all gov-
ernmental records whose disclosure would not significantly harm specific govern-
mental interests. The policy of the Act requires that the disclosure requirement be




nor should that motivation be a matter for courts to concern themselves with
during litigation under the Act.
7 8
Although the Committee's statement was in reference to a requester's right of
access to government records, the same principles should apply when establish-
ing priority of access to these records. This assertion is particularly true in view
of Congress' express determination that "excessive delay by the agency in its
response is often tantamount to denial." '79 Hence, because priority of access is
so interrelated to the right of access itself, it is illogical to permit inquiry into a
person's need to know in either circumstance."
The drawback to this proposed approach is that requesters, recognizing that
they will receive priority status merely by alleging urgency, will naturally opt for
expedited status. As a result, the affected agency will be overwhelmed by
claimants demanding preferential treatment. This consequence, however, is less
serious than it may appear. It must be remembered that the agency's safety
valve of due diligence is still available as a defense against noncompliance with
statutory time limits. Thus, in order to assert an effective defense in this situation,
the agency must show that it is processing the subject request in an efficient
manner, considering the agency's personnel and financial resources, and that this
request has been given priority status over other inquiries which were received
earlier in time but with no allegation of urgency.
What will be accomplished by interpreting the concept of due diligence in
this manner? First, this interpretation recognizes that the affected agency must
exercise due diligence in responding to the request at hand, not to requests in toto.
Second, the approach provides a requester with the opportunity to demand
expedited status without compelling him to divulge his "need to know." Third,
this interpretation, which is consistent with the legislative history, excludes the
authority of such agencies as the FBI to inquire into a person's interest in gaining
access to the requested information.8' Fourth, the number of requesters seeking
preferential status may be surprisingly small. Many applicants may reasonably
believe that by waiting their turn in line they will receive more complete material
from the agency, for example, when the agency releases certain information
which may be technically exempt."s
One important criticism of this interpretation is that those individuals who
78 H. R. REP. No. 92-1419, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 76-77 (1972).
79 H. R. REP. No. 93-867, supra note 2, at 6271.
80 In arguing that its chronological processing sequence should be upheld, the government
has adopted this approach. Thus, in Exner, the assertion was made that the FBI's processing
policy is "consistent with the principle that a requester's right to know is entirely independent
of his need to know." Brief for Appellants at 26, Exner v. FBI, 542 F.2d 1121.
81 The idea of permitting governmental agencies, particularly the law enforcement arm of
the state, to demand why a citizen seeks information is repugnant to the principles advanced
by a democratic society. Further, permitting an agency to inquire into a person's need to
know leaves open the possibility that the agency may deny the applicant's request for political
reasons. Although the Hayden case apparently did not involve political motives, the
Bureau nevertheless told Hayden that it would take four years to process his request. As the
district court properly held, such an extensive time period is not even remotely compatible with
the purposes advanced by the Act and 1974 amendments. Hayden v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 413 F. Supp. 1285, 1287-89 (D.D.C. 1976).
82 Also, "[t]he merely curious may well be motivated enough to write a letter, but not to file
a law suit." Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, No. 76-1371, slip op. at 9
(Leventhal, J., concurring in the result).
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have a real exigent need for immediate access to government material will be in
the same position as those who demand expedited status but do not in fact have
urgent need. This problem is not irremediable, however, and a discussion of its
solution will follow.
F. Judicial Discretion Under § 552(a) (6) (C)
1. Existence of Judicial Discretion Under § 552 (a) (6) (C)
Section 552(a) (6) (C) provides that if the agency can show the existence
of exceptional circumstances and that it is exercising due diligence in responding
to the informational inquiry, then "the court may retain jurisdiction and allow
the agency additional time to complete its review of the records."
' Does the
word, "may," signify that the court has discretion to deny the government's
motion for additional time even though exceptional circumstances exist and the
agency is exercising due diligence? Surprisingly, only one court has explicitly
dealt with this question. In Exner v. FBI, the Ninth Circuit stated: "It is obvious
that [§ 552(a) (6) (C)] gives the district court discretion to allow the govern-
ment additional time to comply." 4Disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation, the government con-
tended that the section does not vest a court with discretion." As authority, the
government relied upon the Senate Report which provides that, if the exceptional
circumstances and due diligence standards are met, "[t]his final court-supervised
extension of time is to be allowed.... "" Countering this statement are the views
espoused by the sponsors of the 1974 amendments. Senator Kennedy implicitly
recognized the court's discretionary role, stating that, if both exceptional cir-
cumstances and due diligence are present, "[t]he agency may ask for, and the
court is authorized to grant, additional time. . . ."" Likewise, Senator Bayh
asserted: "[T]he court still has the discretion to grant the agency more
time. ... ,,18 During the House debate, Congressman Morehead, another sponsor
of the bill, also stated that language was inserted into the section "to authorize the
83 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (6) (0) (emphasis added).
84 542 F.2d at 1112. The other courts which have construed § 552(a) (6) (C) have ignored
the discretionary aspect of the statute. For reasons stated later in this section, the Ninth
Circuit's recognition that the court has discretion to deny the government's motion for addi-
tional time, even though the exceptional circumstances and due diligence standards have been
met, is correct.
85 See Brief for Appellants at 13, Exner v. FBI, 542 F.2d 1121.
86 S. REP. No. 93-854, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1974).
87 In fuller detail, Senator Kennedy stated:
[T]here is the issue of time limits. Our bill provides an agency 10 working days to
respond initially to a request for information, 20 working days on appeal, and an
additional 10 working days where unusual circumstances are present. That gives the
agency 40 working days, or almost two calendar months-more than enough time for
any agency to complete the process of finding and reviewing requested documents.
If a person sues the agency after that time, and the agency is still diligently trying
to complete review of the materials under exceptional circumstances, then we have
another escape valve in the bill-added by specific request of the administration
during our conference. The agency may ask for, and the court is authorized to grant
additional time pending completion of such review.
120 CoNG. REc. 19807 (1974) (emphasis added).
88 Id. at 19818 (emphasis added). Similarly, Senator Bayh expressed at greater length:
[T]he bill permits a court in exceptional circumstances to delay its review of a
case until an agency has had sufficient time to review its records. In other words,
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courts to grant a Federal agency additional time to respond to a request .... 8s
Thus, legislative history exists which supports both the Ninth Circuit and
government views. Due to this conflict, the better approach is to scrutinize the
words of the section in an attempt to discover the congressional intent. The
pertinent language provides that "the court may retain jurisdiction and allow
the agency additional time.. . ." First, it could be argued that the word, "may,"
modifies only the retaining of jurisdiction, and not the granting of additional
time. Under this construction, the court may retain jurisdiction and shall allow
the agency additional time. Under the second interpretation, "may" modifies
both of these terms. Thus, the pertinent language would provide: The court
may retain jurisdiction and may allow the agency additional time.
For a number of reasons, the second construction is the correct approach.
Employing a literal reading of the section, "may" is utilized as a verb. Without
its presence, the second part of the pertinent language would be incomplete, read-
ing "the court ... allow the agency additional time." Moreover, Congress no
doubt was aware of the language it employed in the section. To insert the term
"shall," where it is neither stated nor implied, would be judicial legislation in
clear contravention of express congressional intent. Additionally, Congress
deliberately utilized the word "may," representing that the court has discretion
to grant or deny the agency additional time. If Congress had desired otherwise,
it would have inserted the terms "shall" or "must." An examination of the
language of § 552(a) (6) (C) reveals that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation is
correct. Thus, although the agency may meet the exceptional circumstances and
due diligence requirements, the court has discretion to either grant or deny the
agency's motion for additional time.
2. Proposed Approaches in the Exercise of Judicial Discretion Under §
552 (a) (6) (C)
In exercising this discretion, what considerations should be relevant to the
court? In the preceding section of this article, the argument was made that when
interpreting the concept of due diligence, courts should prohibit an agency from
inquiring into an individual's interest in obtaining access to requested informa-
tion.9" However, one drawback to this approach exists: those individuals with
an exigent need for immediate access are compelled to wait with others who
demand expedited status though they do not have urgent need.9 ' The concept
of judicial discretion, however, may be construed so as to provide a solution to
this problem. Under this suggested approach, the court may consider the in-
dividual's motive for requesting the information when determining whether to
grant favorable treatment.
after the 2 months of administrative deadlines have lapsed and after a complaint has
been filed with the court, the court still has the discretion to grant the agency more
time if exceptional circumstances warrant....
Id. (emphasis added).
89 120 CoNG. REc. 10865 (1974) (emphasis added).
90 See notes 76-82 supra and accompanying text.
91 See note 81 supra and accompanying text. It is certainly equitable that an individual
who must have access to certain material within the very near future should have priority over
other requesters who have no such urgency. See notes 100-04 infra and accompanying text.
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But why should the court, in exercising its discretion, be entitled to inquire
into the requester's motive for seeking access while the agency, under the concept
of due diligence, cannot so inquire? Undoubtedly, the argument can be made, as
it was in the preceding section of this article, that the Freedom of Information
Act prohibits inquiry into a person's "need to know."92 It further can be plaus-
ibly asserted that this policy extends to the judiciary as well as to the affected
agency.9" However, in enacting the time limits imposed by the 1974 amend-
ments, Congress was unaware of the massive complications which were to arise."
Because of the overwhelming number of requests and the inadequate allocation
of financial and personnel resources, agencies, as with the FBI, have had great
difficulties in complying with the statutory time limits. 5 Under such circum-
stances, it is logical to assume that, if it had the opportunity to confront this
problem, Congress would grant priority status to those individuals who had an
urgent need for the requested information. Such need for expedited treatment
can only be uncovered if the individual requester is willing to divulge to the court
his motive for obtaining access.
The question remains, however, why the agency should not as well be en-
titled to inquire into the requester's motive under the due diligence concept.
First, unlike the judiciary, the affected agency is a biased party. By interpreting
the due diligence provision so that only the most urgent reasons justify expedited
treatment, the agency's burden in showing that it is exercising due diligence is
significantly lessened. Under this approach, the agency enjoys immense power
to arbitrarily reject a request for expedited status on the mere ground that the
agency does not believe the applicant, or deems the request to be frivolous.
Two examples will suffice to illustrate this point. In Exner, the FBI rejected
Judith Exner's request on the basis that the agency found that her fear for her
security was without substance.9 Likewise, in Cleaver, Eldridge Cleaver sought
expedited treatment in order to obtain information which could be
utilized for his imminent California trial. The FBI denied his application without
providing Cleaver any explanation other than that the agency was overwhelmed
92 See notes 76-82 supra and accompanying text.
93 Thus, the requester's motive for obtaining access would not be "a matter for courts
to concern themselves with during litigation under the Act." H. R. RFP. No. 92-1419, 92nd
Cong., 2d Sess. 76-77 '(1972).
94 See H. R. REP. No. 93-876, supra note 2, at 6274-75. As discussed earlier in the article,
Congress believed that the 1974 amendments could be effectively implemented with little in-
crease in an agency's personnel and cost expenditures. This prediction has proved to be in-
correct. See notes 42-50 supra and accompanying text.
95 It is arguable, of course, that the FBI would be able to process all informational requests
within the statutory time limits if it would reassign additional personnel from other divisions
within the agency. Such reallocation, however, might hinder the efficiency of the agency's
other functions. See notes 52-55 supra and accompanying text.
96 See Brief for Appellants at 4, Exner v. FBI, 542 F.2d 1121. Referring to the govern-
ment's characterization of Exner's fear as being without substance, the district judge in Exner
replied:
The Government observes that with regard to any possible death threats against her
on threats of harm, that there is no evidence of that. Well, threats of that kind
frequently, or at least sometimes, do not manifest themselves until some harm occurs.
Whether her fears are genuine or just imaginary, I think she should be at least
given the opportunity to see the non-exempt materials in her file so that she can
perhaps be on her guard against harm, or perhaps these materials would set at rest
her possible fears.
Exner v. FBI, No. - (rep. trans. at 20 S.D. Cal.), remanded, 542 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1976).
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with informational requests.97 From these cases, the conclusion must be reached
that there exists no justifiable reason why an agency should be given this vast
arbitrary authority, and, on this basis alone, an agency should not be permitted
to inquire into a requester's motive for seeking access. Moreover, providing a
governmental agency with this power of inquiry would dissuade individuals from
applying for expedited status. Realizing that the agency can compel the ap-
plicant to divulge his motive, the citizen is likely to wait his turn rather than be
subjected to governmental coercion. The same consequence, however, does not
follow if a court is authorized to inquire into the applicant's reasons for seeking
preferential treatment. Unlike the affected agency, a court is an impartial
decision-maker having the reputation among the populace of administering
justice evenhandedly.9" Thus, there is no threat of coercion and, in all proba-
bility, no attending result that individuals will be deterred from applying for
expedited status. For these reasons, the exercise of judicial discretion under §
552(a) (6) (C) should be construed so as to permit a court, once the agency has
satisfied the exceptional circumstances and due diligence requirements, to inquire
into an applicant's motive for seeking preferential status.
Another consideration that may be relevant in the exercise of judicial
discretion is whether the filing of suit by itself should be a priority-indicating
factor of significance. Concurring in Open America, Judge Leventhal contended
that the bringing of a court action "is not a fool proof way of assigning priority,
but it is material and by no means unprecedented."99 The Ninth Circuit agreed
with the Leventhal approach, holding that "the filing of suit by a person de-
manding information can (but does not necessarily) move such petitioner 'up the
line' .... ."' The majority in Open America, however, disagreed. The court
stated that the filing of suit is irrelevant since, if this approach is adopted, the
courts would be flooded with applicants seeking expedited status. As a result,
because of the huge number of lawsuits that would be brought, the litigating ap-
plicants would be no better off than if their priorities were fixed by the agency.'"
97 Cleaver v. Kelly, 413 F. Supp. at 175 (D.D.C. 1976). Even more surprising is the
failure of the district court to even consider whether the Cleavers' allegation of urgency should
be a relevant factor in the court's determination. Id. at 176; see Open America v. Watergate
Special Prosecution Force, No. 76-1371, slip op. at 5 n.4 (Leventhal, J., concurring in the
result).
98 Wasserstrom has stated this principle most eloquently:
In a society such as ours, the legal system is called upon to resolve a multiplicity of
problems and to settle innumerable controversies. It is also its function to ensure that
certain standards are given effect in the deliberative dealings of man with man. The
judiciary is entrusted with a delicate but almost boundless power over the lives of
those persons who have been accused of transgressions against the community; it is
also given the authority to decide what shall be done in those cases in which .the
parties have quite inadvertently worked themselves into a position from which
voluntary extrication is impossible. These situations may all involve considerations of
the greatest import to the litigants; they all surely demand that the judiciary function
in such a way that each case is justly decided.
R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DEcIsioN 84-85 (1961). See also A. Cox, THE ROLE oF
THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 103-04 (1976); L. FULLER, THE MORALITY
OF LAW 157-59 (1969); H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 153-63 (1961).
99 Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, No. 76-1371, slip op. at 8
(Leventhal, J., concurring in the result).
100 Exner v. FBI, 542 F.2d at 1123.
101 Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, No. 76-1371, slip op. at 18.
"[Elven those with the dimmest of eyesight could look ahead a few months and see that the
regulation in all agencies, not just the FBI, lould very shortly become the function of the
courts." Id. (emphasis in original).
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Furthermore, giving preferential treatment to those individuals who file suit
would be discriminating against others who could not afford to hire an attorney
and bring such an action. °2 Responding to the majority's second point, Judge
Leventhal argued that no discrimination exists on the basis of wealth since
Congress provided for litigation costs and attorney fees. 03
Which view is correct? The answer is that neither view is entirely correct.
The Open America majority's assertion that assigning priority to those applicants
who file suit would result in the flooding of court calendars ignores the content
of Judge Leventhal's concurring opinion. Judge Leventhal stated that filing
suit is a material factor in assigning priority, but not necessarily a conclusive
one.10 Further, granting priority to litigants promotes the legitimate purpose of
distinguishing between those requesters who have a genuine need for expedited
status, as opposed to those who are merely curious.' In all likelihood, only those
individuals with a genuine urgency would seek court redress. On the other hand,
Judge Leventhal contended that granting priority to those applicants who file
suit does not discriminate against the poor, since Congress provided for the award
of litigation costs and attorney fees." 6 The pertinent statute, however, provides
that "[t]he court may assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees
and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under this section in
which the complainant has substantially prevailed."'"" Hence, there are two un-
predictable consequences which must follow before the requester recovers his
litigation expenses. First, he must substantially prevail in his lawsuit. Second,
the court, in exercising its discretion under the statute, must determine that his
expenses should be assessed against the government. These consequences surely
do not necessarily result from bringing a court action. Those individuals who do
not have sufficient financial resources to hire an attorney and file suit will still
be deterred from taking appropriate action. For the poor, therefore, the statute
presents too many questionable variables. Rather than possibly lose their law-
suits or have the court decline to assess litigation expenses against the government,
102 Id.
103 Id. at 9-10 n.10 (Leventhal, J., concurring in the result).
104 It is plausible to interpret Judge Leventhal's opinion as granting litigants an automatic
preference. If so, then granting such automatic priority would indeed, as the majority asserted,
result in the flooding of court calendars. The Ninth Circuit expressly confronted this inquiry
by holding that filing suit is a relevant, but not necessarily a conclusive, factor in assigning
priority. 542 F.2d at 1123.
105 Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, No. 76-1371, slip op. at 9-10 n.
10 (Leventhal, J., concurring in the result). But see Brief for Appellants at 20, Exner v.
'FBI, 542 F.2d 1121, where the assertion was made that the chronological processing approach
must be upheld by the courts:
[Ihe most significant legal issue involved here is .. .whether the chronological
sequence system utilized by the FBI should be forced to give way when a requester
resorts to litigation. It is, of course, the Government's position that chronological
sequence must be maintained under all circumstances to assure that all requesters
are treated even-handedly ...
Id. (emphasis added).
106 Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, No. 76-1371, slip op. at 9-10
n.10 (Leventhal, J., concurring in the result).
107 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (E). The legislative history of the 1974 amendments also
indicates that the award of attorney fees and court costs is at the court's discretion. See H. R.
REP. No. 93-876, supra note 2, at 6272.
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these individuals will be reconciled to wait their turn in line." 8 Hence, the
Open America majority's conclusion in this respect is correct. The assigning of
priority to applicants merely because they file suit discriminates against those
who are financially unable to afford these litigation expenses.
Because of this fact, courts should refuse to give preferential status to re-
questers merely because they file suit. Thus, the filing of suit, by itself, should not
be a priority-indicating factor of significance. It may be true that the bringing
of court actions will be primarily undertaken by those individuals who have
a genuine urgency for receiving preferential treatment. But this consideration,
under the analysis proposed. 9 has already been taken into account. Under this
approach, courts in exercising their discretion under § 552 (a) (6) (C) may
inquire into the applicant's motive for seeking preferential status.
In conclusion, under § 552(a) (6) (C), the court has discretion to deny the
agency's motion for additional time even though exceptional circumstances exist
and the agency is exercising due diligence. In exercising this discretion, the
question arises as to what considerations should be relevant to the court. Two
such considerations are proposed. Under the first, a court, in determining
whether to grant preferential treatment, is entitled to inquire into an individual's
motive for requesting the material. The second queries whether the filing of a
lawsuit by itself should be a priority-indicating factor of significance. For reasons
advanced in the analysis of each of these two considerations, the conclusion must
be reached that only the former consideration is relevant to the court's determi-
nation.
III. Remedies Available Under § 552(a) (6) (C)
A. Contempt Power of the Courts
Assuming that the agency fails to show the existence of exceptional circum-
stances or the exercise of due diligence, or, a court in its discretionary authority
declines to grant the agency additional time to process the request, the question
arises as to what remedies are available to the court to ensure agency compliance
with its order. First, consider the situation where the agency is capable of
processing the request within the time limits imposed by the court. This situation
creates no unusual difficulties, since the agency should be treated as any other
defendant who is able to comply with the court's order. If the agency disobeys
108 See generally Cahn & Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L. J.
1317 (1964):
The poor live in a legal universe which has, by and large, been ignored by legal
scholars. Low visibility decisions decide their destiny; official discretion determines
their fate. . . . All of us are subject to the law's delay, to official obtuseness and to
unreasoned discretion. But persons with resources can avert the hardship these
factors work. Status affords protection. Businessmen and officials alike take pause
and reflect before acting to the detriment of persons who are not defenseless. The
poor have no such protection against unreasoned, or unprincipled, thoughtless action.
And for this very reason, there is a greater need for clarification of legal status,
policies and rights in those areas of the law which affect the poor most frequently
and adversely.
Id. at 1340-41.
109 See notes 90-98 supra and accompanying text.
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the order, then it should be held in contempt to coerce compliance." °
On the other hand, suppose the agency clearly does not have the requisite
financial and personnel resources to comply with the court's order. Under
present authority, the agency would not be subject to contempt. As stated in the
Train decision, "[i]t would be unreasonable and unjust to hold in contempt a
defendant who demonstrated that he was powerless to comply.""
B. Reallocation of Agency's Resources by the Courts
May the court order the agency to reallocate funds and manpower from
other divisions within the agency to the Freedom of Information Act division to
guarantee that the agency will have sufficient resources to comply with the stat-
utory time limits? For instance, if the agency is allocating one hundred em-
ployees and one million dollars to process informational requests, may the court
order the agency to reassign another one hundred workers from other divisions
within the agency and rechannel an additional one million dollars which would
be otherwise spent for different purposes? This question has not yet been con-
sidered by the courts, but is certainly a crucial issue in ascertaining what
remedies may be available under § 552(a) (6) (C).
In analyzing this question, the first inquiry is whether the affected agency
has attempted to implement the pertinent congressional program or whether it
has ignored that policy. Recent decisions hold that, if the agency neglects to
comply with the congressional intent, the judiciary may intervene to redress this
wrong." 2 As phrased by one court:
It is not [the agency's] prerogative to disagree with Congressional policy and
refuse to implement it. An administrative agency is required to effectuate,
not ignore, Congressional intent, whether the agency agrees with Congress
or not. The judicial branch has the function of requiring the executive (or
administrative) branch to comply with requirements set up by the legislative
branch."1
3
Applying this principle to those agencies within the scope of the Freedom of
Information Act, the question is whether these agencies have reassigned person-
nel and other resources in an effort to comply with the statutory time limits."'
110 See Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, No. 76-1371, slip op. at 5-6
(Leventhal, J., concurring in the result).
111 Natel Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d at 713. Accord, Maggio v.
Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 72-73, 73 n.6 (1948). See notes 13-16 supra and accompanying text.
112 See Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Train, 489 F.2d 492, 498 (4th Cir. 1973), vacated
on other grounds, 415 U.S. 36 (1975); National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v.
Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1971). As stated by the Fourth Circuit:
When the executive exercises its responsibility under appropriation legislation in
such a manner as to frustrate the Congressional purpose, either by absolute refusal
to spend or by a withholding of so substantial an amount of the appropriation as to
make impossible the attainment of the legislative goals, the executive trespasses beyond
the range of its legal discretion and presents an issue of constitutional dimensions
which is obviously open to judicial review. ..
489 F.2d at 498.
113 Ross v. Community Services, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 278, 286 (D. Md. 1975).
114 This question must be raised because Congress anticipated some reallocation of agency




In the case of the FBI, by reassigning large numbers of employees and expending
enormous sums of money, that agency has displayed a good faith intent to process
informational requests as soon as feasibly possible."' As such, the FBI has
adequately shown that it has attempted to implement the congressional policy ad-
vanced by the 1974 amendments.
The second inquiry is whether constitutional rights are at stake. Emerging
authority holds that if an administrative agency, or for that matter a state legis-
lature or Congress, administers a program in such a manner so as to deprive
individuals of their constitutional rights, then the courts will intervene to correct
this situation.' Referring to conditions in an Alabama state mental institution
which denied patients their constitutional right to treatment, Judge Wisdom
answered Governor Wallace's argument that the duty of allocating funds among
competing state programs is reserved solely for the state governor and legislature
by replying:
[S]tate legislatures are ordinarily free to choose among various social services
competing for legislative attention and state funds. But that does not mean
that a state legislature is free, for budgetary or any other reasons, to provide
a social service in a manner which will result in the denial of individuals'
constitutional rights." 7
At first glance, Judge Wisdom's insightful comments are not applicable here.
The right to obtain access to information within a specified number of days is a
right which is statutorily, rather than constitutionally, created. An argument can
be made, however, that the principles enunciated by Judge Wisdom should be
extended to encompass the instant situation. Although not a constitutional right,
Congress made it manifestly clear in enacting the statutory time limits to the
1974 amendments that excessive delay by an agency in processing an informa-
tional request frequently has the same effect as denying that request." 8 Hence,
these time limits seek to ensure access to official information which has been un-
necessarily withheld from the public." 9 In this respect, the 1974 amendments
115 Both the District of Columbia and Ninth Circuits agree that the FBI is attempting in
good faith to comply with the statutory time limits. See 542 F.2d at 1123; Open America v.
Watergate Special Prosecution Force, No. 76-1371, slip op. at 20. Whether this effort shows
the existence of exceptional circumstances or the exercising of due diligence, however, raises a
totally different question.
116 See Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974), modifying Wyatt v. Stickney,
344 F.Supp. 387 (D. Ala. 1972); Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 976 (1974); Campbell v. Beto, 460 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1972); Holt v. Sarver, 442
F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'g 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F.
Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974). As stated by the district court in Holt:
Let there be no mistake in the matter; the obligation of the Respondents to eliminate
existing unconstitutionalities does not depend upon what the Legislature may do, or
upon what the Governor may do, or, indeed, upon what Respondents may actually be
able to accomplish. If Arkansas is going to operate a Penitentiary System, it is going
to have to be a system that is countenanced by the Constitution of the United States.
309 F. Supp. at 385.
117 503 F.2d at 1314-15. "Inadequate resources can never be an adequate justification for
the state's depriving any person of his constitutional rights." Id. at 1315, quoting Hamilton v.
Love, 328 F.Supp. 1182, 1194 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
118 See H. R. RaP. No. 93-876, supra note 2, at 6271.
119 Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973); see Soucie v.
David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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comport with the established principle that in a democratic society the populace
has the right to be informed." o
Thus, the 1974 amendments, although not presently viewed as reaching
constitutional magnitude, 21 are nevertheless vitally important in securing public
access to government information. As such, they represent a fundamental
statutory entitlement for the American people. 22 It may be plausibly argued
that when an administrative agency declines to employ sufficient funds and per-
sonnel to comply with the time imits imposed by the amendments, the court
should order that agency to restructure its resources. Although rearrangement
by the agency may result in less efficient operation of its other functions, the goal
of securing prompt public access may be worth that cost. Further, it may be
contended that only by decreasing the agency's resources in its other areas will
Congress be provided with the impetus to allocate additional funds. For example
in the case of the FBI, ordering the agency to devote additional expenditures
and manpower to process informational requests may very well diminish that
agency's abilities to effectively administer its law enforcement duties. However,
this may be the only way to impel Congress to recognize and promulgate a
solution to the problem.
It must be remembered, however, that the process of ordering an admin-
istrative agency to reallocate personnel and funds from other departments within
the agency, in order to secure a statutory entitlement, raises a number of questions
regarding the separation of powers and the proper role of the judiciary. In this
respect, the above proposal is not necessarily a recommendation for courts to
adopt but an important alternative which they should carefully consider in
devising remedies under § 552(a) (6) (C).
IV. Conclusion
The assurance of more efficient, prompt, and complete disclosure of in-
formation was the objective Congress made manifestly clear in enacting the
1974 amendments. With this goal in mind, this article attempted to provide a
construction of § 552(a) (6) (C) which comports with congressional intent.
Although the interpretation advanced places a substantial burden upon the
agency to justify noncompliance with the statutory time limits, such a construc-
tion is wholly consistent with Congress' goal of securing prompt public access to
official information. Thus, although the adoption of the suggested statutory
interpretation may cause hardship to the affected agency, the courts must not
substitute expedience for proper statutory construction. More important than
agency inconvenience and hardship is the accomplishment of the objectives of the
Freedom of Information Act and its 1974 amendments. That purpose relates
120 The principles underlying the enactment of open meeting statutes. Many of the con-
cepts applicable to the "sunshine laws" are relevant as well to the purposes advanced by the
1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act. Note, Open Meeting Statutes, The
Press Fights for the "Right to Know," 75 HR&v. L. RPv. 1199, 1203 (1962).
121 It must be remembered that the Constitution is not a static document but rather is
"intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of
human affairs. . . " McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819)
(Marshall, C.J.) '(emphasis in original).
122 See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970).
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to the basic concept that, in a democratic society, the citizenry has the right to
be informed. In promoting this principle, Congress explicitly recognized that
information frequently is useful only if it is timely, and that excessive delay in
processing a request may well be tantamount to denial of the request. The
judiciary, in striving to preserve this congressional objective, may properly im-
pose a substantial burden upon an agency to justify noncompliance with stat-
utory time limits.
